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The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in  
Truth Commission Administered Accountability Initiatives  
 
Abstract 
In recent times, transitional justice practice has increasingly seen truth commissions 
tasked with administering accountability programmes, distinct from and in addition to 
their traditional truth-seeking role. Such accountability schemes typically take the 
form of granting or recommending amnesty for those who disclose involvement in 
past crimes or facilitating reintegration on the basis of similar disclosures. Self-
incriminating disclosures made in the course of traditional truth commission 
proceedings generally attract a robust set of legal safeguards. However, the 
protections within transitional accountability schemes administered by truth 
commissions tend to be less stringent. This article explores this anomaly, focusing 
particularly on the extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination is protected 
within truth commission administered accountability programmes. It considers the 
programmes operated to date, and the levels of protection afforded, and demonstrates 
a lack of consistent practice in the safeguarding of individual rights within these 
programmes. It examines international legal standards on the privilege against self-
incrimination and questions whether the procedures operated by accountability 
programmes can be reconciled with international norms in order to protect those who 
make self-incriminating disclosures within accountability initiatives. The article 
argues that a failure to ensure individual rights against self-incrimination risks 
compromising the efficacy of the programmes themselves and the contribution that 
they can make to long term peace and reconciliation in transitional states.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Ensuring individual rights in truth commission proceedings has become an important 
aspect of mandate design and operational practice. Since the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was challenged on the fairness and impartiality of 
its proceedings,
1
 truth commissions have routinely been created with procedural 
safeguards and guarantees of due process governing their operations.
2
 These 
procedural protections are not replicated in the accountability programmes now 
frequently administered by truth commissions, which most often involve truth telling 
in exchange for grants of or recommendations for amnesty. Those who participate in 
these initiatives do not seem to be protected by the same network of legal safeguards, 
despite the fact that the outcomes of these programmes might have significant legal 
ramifications. While the outcome of traditional truth commission proceedings might 
be findings of factual responsibility for or involvement in past violations, albeit with 
                                                        
1
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, (2002), Vol. 1, Ch. 7; Vol. 6, Section 1, 
Ch. 4. 
2
 See: UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/10 on the Establishment of a Commission for Reception, Truth 
and Reconciliation in East Timor, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/10, 13 July 2001, s. 17; Kenya, Truth 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008, s.28; Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, (2004), Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 151, 154. 
 3 
implications for reputation rights,
3
 no civil or criminal repercussions flow directly 
from such findings. In contrast, the outcome of accountability programmes may be 
referral to prosecuting authorities and the recommendation of initiation of criminal 
proceedings, raising questions as to whether, and in what ways, incriminating 
disclosures made during the course of accountability proceedings might then be made 
available to and utilized by prosecutorial bodies. Indeed, in some contexts, 
accountability schemes have been predicated on the assumption that where, for 
example, amnesty is not granted prosecutions will follow.
4
  In light of this contrast, it 
is striking that truth commission hearings typically engage rights against self-
incrimination or afford use immunity to any incriminating information compelled,
5
 
while accountability programmes may require the provision of self incriminating 
information in order to participate and make no such guarantees of non-disclosure or 
use immunity.
6
  
 
This issue comes to the fore as Nepal establishes transitional mechanisms to address 
past violations. The Nepalese truth commission is, in addition to fulfilling a 
traditional truth seeking function, responsible for making recommendations for 
                                                        
3
 A. Bisset, ‘Principle 9: Guarantees for Persons Implicated’ in F. Haldemann, P. Gaeta and T. Unger 
(eds), Commentary on the UN Principles to Combat Impunity (2016) (forthcoming). 
4
 A. Bisset, Truth Commissions and Criminal Courts, (2012), 74-103.  
5
 South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995, s.31(3); Ghana, National 
Reconciliation Commission Act 2002, s.15(2); Kenya, Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
Act 2008, s.24(3).  
6
 See, Chega!, Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation for East Timor, 
(2006), Part 9.  
 4 
amnesty.
7
 In order to be eligible for such a recommendation, it seems that the person 
concerned must make full disclosure of their involvement in past violations.
8
 
However, the enacting domestic legislation offers no guidance on whether or how the 
due process rights of participants might be protected or how the information they 
disclose will be utilized.  
 
This article explores the extent to which those who participate in truth commission 
administered accountability programmes are legally protected, with a particular focus 
on the privilege against self-incrimination. It will consider the programmes operated 
to date and examine the levels of protection typically afforded. It will examine 
international legal standards on the privilege against self-incrimination and question 
whether the procedures operated by accountability programmes can be reconciled 
with international norms in order to protect those who make self-incriminating 
disclosures within accountability initiatives. The article will demonstrate a lack of 
consistent practice in the safeguarding of individual rights within these programmes. 
It will argue that a failure to ensure individual rights against self-incrimination risks 
compromising the efficacy of the systems themselves and the contribution that they 
can make to long term peace and reconciliation in transitional states.  
 
 
 
2. Truth commissions, accountability initiatives and procedural protection 
                                                        
7
 Ordinance on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 14 March 
2013, Ordinance No. 8 of 2012/2013, s.23. 
8
 S. 23(5). 
 5 
 
Although truth commissions are not courts, their operation raises a range of due 
process related issues. They are routinely created with quasi-judicial powers
9
 to issue 
summonses and subpoenas, conduct search and seizure operations and require the 
delivery of statements under oath. It is common for commissions to publish the names 
of individuals and institutions considered responsible for past violations in their final 
reports. There is agreement that it is not necessary for commissions to adhere to the 
strict standards of criminal trials, with which due process is normally associated, 
because the consequences of being found responsible by a commission are much less 
severe than those of being found guilty in a court.
10
 However, it has been argued that 
where similar rights are implicated, due process standards ‘provide a useful 
benchmark of fairness’ for commissions.11 Internationally agreed principles evince a 
consensus that commissions should adhere to certain standards, such as notifying 
those implicated of the allegations against them, affording them a right to reply, 
ensuring the right against self-incrimination, corroborating implicating information 
before publicly naming individuals and making clear that published findings do not 
constitute judgments of legal or criminal guilt.
12
 Modern enacting legislation has 
typically stipulated that self-incriminating evidence obtained under truth commission 
                                                        
9
 M. Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, (2006). 
10
 UNHCHR, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions, (2006), 21. 
11
 Freeman, supra note 9, 110; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, A/67/368, 13 September 2012, paras. 72-3. 
12
 D. Orentlicher, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, Principle 9; 
E. González and H. Varney (eds.), Truth Seeking: Elements of Creating an Effective Truth 
Commission, (2013), 26; UNHCHR, supra note 10, 21-22. 
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powers of compulsion cannot be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.
13
 Final 
reports document commission efforts to base findings on pre-determined standards of 
proof
14
 and to adhere to standards of procedural fairness, despite the difficulties of 
locating implicated persons in order to notify them
15
 and afford them the right to 
reply,
16
 and the complexities of corroborating thousands of statements.
17
  
 
Of late, truth commissions have not only been tasked with uncovering and recording 
the truth. Increasingly, they are called upon to administer accountability programmes 
and, within these, to exercise additional, sometimes adjudicative, functions. As well 
as traditional truth seeking, accountability programmes such as granting amnesty in 
exchange for truthful testimony,
18
 drawing up community service agreements 
between perpetrators and their communities
19
 and deciding on financial compensation 
arrangements for victims
20
 have all featured in recent truth commission mandates. 
                                                        
13
 South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995, s. 31(3); Ghana, National 
Reconciliation Commission Act 2002, s. 15(2); An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) of Liberia 2005, s. 30; Kenya, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act 2008, s. 24(3).  
14
 Chega!, supra note 6, Part 2, paras. 34-5; Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
for Liberia (2009), Vol. 1, Section 2, Part C; TRC of South Africa Report, supra note 1, Vol. 1, Ch. 4; 
From Madness to Hope: The Twelve Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth 
for El Salvador, UN Doc. S/25500 (1993), Ann.; Witness to Truth, supra note 2, Vol. 2, Ch. 2, para. 5.  
15
 Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, (2013), Vol. 1, Ch. 2 para. 61. See also 
Witness to Truth, ibid, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 154-55; Report of the TRC for Liberia, ibid, Vol. II, 190.  
16
 Chega!, supra note 6, Part 2, para. 34. 
17
 Witness to Truth, supra note 2, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 151. 
18
 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995, Ch. Four. 
19
 UNTAET Regulation 2001/10, ss. 22-32. 
20
 Freeman, supra note 9, 35. 
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This represents an acknowledgement in transitional justice practice of the importance 
of implementing multi-faceted programmes, which address the range of victim and 
societal needs and interests. Studies show that national level initiatives, and in 
particular the need to ensure the accountability of low-level perpetrators, are as 
important to victims as international prosecutions of those most responsible for the 
most serious crimes.
21
 If future transitional programmes also encompass efforts to 
address lower-level responsibility it seems likely that, as has been the situation to 
date, truth commissions may be tasked with delivering those schemes. That being the 
case, it is important that truth commissions operate in accordance with internationally 
accepted standards of fairness in their administration of accountability programmes. 
Arguably, it is more important that such standards are adhered to in relation to 
accountability programmes because, as discussed above, the consequences that flow 
from them are often more significant than those which flow from simple truth seeking 
operations. Yet to date, adherence to standards of fairness has been less consistent 
and, in some cases, much less rigorous within accountability initiatives than it has 
been within truth commission proceedings.  
 
 
 
2.1. South Africa 
 
South Africa’s truth for amnesty model remains the highest profile accountability 
initiative and has served to inform subsequent mechanisms. While it did not operate 
                                                        
21
 No Peace Without Justice, Closing the Gap: The Role of Non-Judicial Mechanisms in Addressing 
Impunity, (2010). 
 8 
without issue,
22
 the South African model was carefully constructed. The TRC’s 
Amnesty Committee was tasked with granting amnesty to individuals who submitted 
timely applications making full disclosure of politically motivated acts involving a 
gross violation of human rights.
23
 The 1995 Act laid down a detailed procedure, 
outlining the process by which applications were to be considered and affording 
applicants rights to notification of hearings, to appear, to testify, to adduce evidence 
and to be informed, in writing, of the Committee’s decision.24 A grant of amnesty 
extinguished all criminal and civil liability relating to the act. Any criminal conviction 
based upon the act was expunged from official records.
25
 For those who were not 
granted amnesty, and therefore remained liable to civil and criminal trial, 
incriminating information obtained by the Commission could not be used in 
prosecutorial investigations
26
 and was not admissible in any subsequent court 
proceedings.
27
 Where proceedings had been halted due to an amnesty application, and 
the application had not been successful, no adverse inference was to be drawn from 
the resumption of proceedings by the court concerned. 
28
 The South African model 
therefore sought to deliver a high level of protection to those who applied for amnesty 
                                                        
22
 A. du Bois-Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa, (2007), 185; J. Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks: 
The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process, (2004), 127-34.  
23
 S. 20(1). 
24
 Ss.19 and 21. 
25
 S. 20(7). 
26
 P. Gready, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa and Beyond, (2011), 102. 
27
 S. 31(3). 
28
 S.21(2)(b). 
 9 
and to maintain fairness in both amnesty proceedings and any subsequent action 
involving the same conduct.   
 
 
2.2. Timor Leste 
 
The Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) provides 
another example of a commission that administered an accountability programme. 
The Timorese model displays a contrast in levels of protection between the operations 
of the Commission itself and those of the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) 
that it administered. Prosecution was the central focus of the Timorese transitional 
justice programme. In order to maximize the possibilities for criminal justice, the 
Commission was under an obligation to refer human rights violations to the Office of 
the General Prosecutor (OGP), with recommendations for the prosecution of offences 
where appropriate.
29
 To protect the due process rights of those who appeared before 
the CAVR, safeguards were included in the commission’s enacting legislation. 
Witnesses could be compelled to appear before the commission
30
 and to answer 
questions under oath,
31
 but they could not be compelled to give self-incriminating 
evidence or evidence that would incriminate a close relative.
32
 Those invited or 
compelled to appear had the right to legal representation
33
 and the commission’s 
                                                        
29
 UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/10, s 3.1(c). 
30
 S. 14.1(c). 
31
 S. 14 .1(d). 
32
 Ss.17.1 and .17.2. 
33
 S. 18. 
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search and seizure powers were to be exercised in accordance with a detailed 
procedure. 
34
 
 
A less stringent set of safeguards applied to the CAVR administered CRP. The CRP 
allowed perpetrators of minor offences to obtain immunity from prosecution
35
 by 
submitting a statement to the Commission, admitting responsibility for past crimes in 
a community hearing and undertaking an act of reconciliation.
36
 Initial statements 
made within the context of the CRP had to be forwarded to the OGP where it was 
decided whether the Prosecutor’s jurisdiction would be exercised or whether the case 
could be dealt with through a CRP.
37
 However, the CRP process was not regulated in 
the same way as disclosures made within the truth seeking proceedings. In particular, 
participants had no right to legal representation. Burgess notes that the CRP resulted 
in a situation where the OGP had access to all deponent statements on their 
involvement in past events, which they had made without legal advice.
 38
  Although 
deponents were advised that statements could be used in prosecutions, they provided 
information in the belief that they would not be prosecuted, but reintegrated through 
CRP.  
 
                                                        
34
 S. 15. 
35
 Chega!, supra note 4, paras. 3-4. 
36
 Ibid, Part 9.2, para. 10.  
37
 Ibid, para. 10. 
38
 P. Burgess, ‘East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process’, in N. Roht-Arriaza and J. 
Mariezcurrena (eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, 
(2006), 176-205, 195-196. 
 11 
In practice, 85 cases were retained by the OGP. 32 were adjourned mid-hearing as 
credible evidence of involvement in a serious crime came to light, rendering them 
outside the mandate of the CAVR.
39
 Limited resources meant that these cases could 
not be investigated.
40
 However, had the capacity been available, prosecutions might 
have been initiated on the basis of self-incriminating information provided by the 
accused in the belief that disclosure was necessary to participate in a reintegration and 
reconciliation process. That evidence would have been provided without legal advice 
or representation. It seems somewhat incongruous that participation in truth 
commission hearings should attract a well thought out series of safeguards, while the 
reintegration process administered by the same body should entail virtually none and 
have the potential to create situations where due process rights might be seriously 
undermined.  
 
 
2.3. Kenya 
 
In 2006, Burgess argued that the inadequacies of the Timorese CRP should be 
remedied in any similar, future programmes.
41
 Kenya’s 2008 Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) Act seemed to move in this direction. Although 
the TJRC ultimately decided not to operate the amnesty scheme laid down in its 
enacting legislation,
42
 the Act provided protections for those who might have taken 
                                                        
39
 Chega!, supra note 4, Part 9, para.102. 
40
 Ibid, para. 169. 
41
 Burgess, supra note 38, at 196. 
42
 TJRC Report, supra note 15,Vol. 1, Ch. 2, 71. 
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part. The Act gave the TJRC authority to receive applications and make 
recommendations for amnesty for acts or omissions not amounting to international 
crimes or gross violations of human rights.
43
 Where amnesty hearings were convened, 
the applicant had rights to be notified,
44
 to be present and to testify,
45
 and to have 
legal representation.
46
 Any ongoing civil or criminal proceedings could be suspended 
pending an amnesty decision
47
 and applicants were to be notified in writing and with 
reasons of any refusal.
48
 Any confession or admission submitted in relation to the 
amnesty application was prohibited from use in subsequent court proceedings, 
regardless of the amnesty outcome.
49
   
 
In many ways, the 2008 Kenyan Act mirrors the protections offered by the earlier 
South African TRC, although it does not prevent the drawing of adverse inferences 
where proceedings have been halted due to an amnesty application and then resumed. 
However, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (Hearing Procedure) Rules 2011 
enable the TJRC to recommend prosecutions and require it to support the 
recommendation with evidence showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that a crime was committed by that person.
50
 There is no apparent bar on the use of 
admissions or confessions submitted in respect of amnesty applications for this 
                                                        
43
 S. 34(1)-(3). 
44
 S. 36(5)(a). 
45
 S. 36(5)(b). 
46
 S. 28. 
47
 S.36(7) and (8).  
48
 S. 40.  
49
 S.36(9)(c). 
50
 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (Hearing Procedure) Rules 2011, s. 19(2). 
 13 
purpose. Although admissions could not be used as direct evidence in court against 
the person who made the statement, they might nevertheless be passed to 
prosecutorial bodies and used to further criminal investigations. A situation arises, 
albeit hypothetical in this instance, where individuals disclose involvement in past 
crimes in order to be eligible for consideration under one transitional process, 
presumably unaware that it might be passed to prosecuting bodies and used to initiate 
criminal investigations.  
 
 
2.4. Nepal 
 
More unsatisfactory is the Nepalese Commission on Investigation of Disappeared 
Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Act, 2071 (2014),
51
 under which the truth 
commission will fulfill a truth seeking function, as well as make recommendations for 
amnesty
52
 and for prosecutions before a future Special Court.
53
 The recommendations 
may therefore have significant legal impact, yet potential participants in the amnesty 
process do not appear to be afforded any procedural protections.  
 
                                                        
51
 On the original Nepali model see International Commission of Jurists, Authority without 
Accountability: The Struggle for Justice in Nepal, (2013); OHCHR, Comments on the Nepal 
‘Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Ordinance’ – 2069 
(2013)’ (2013). 
52
 Controversially, the 2014 Act, s.26, maintains the possibility of amnesty for gross violations of 
human rights. See International Commission of Jurists, Justice Denied: The 2014 Commission on 
Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Act, (2014).  
53
 Ss. 25 and 29. 
 14 
Amnesty applicants are required to make full, written disclosure of their past 
activities, including an acceptance of having committed gross violations of human 
rights, repentance and apology for those actions and a commitment not to repeat 
them.
54
 The Act discusses ‘investigations’ related to amnesty applications, which may 
include ascertaining the views of victims.
55
 It is not clear whether these 
‘investigations’ might include hearings, but if they do, there is no provision for 
notification of the applicant or of any right to be present, to reply to accusations or to 
legal representation. There is no prohibition on the use of amnesty application 
disclosures in any subsequent proceedings against the applicant or on the sharing of 
these disclosures with other institutions, including prosecutorial bodies. The opposite 
appears true. The Act makes provision for the Commission’s information to be 
available to other bodies to which it might be useful and for the Commission to 
cooperate with any other agency established by the Government, presumably 
including those pursuing criminal investigations. The recommendatory roles relating 
to amnesty and prosecutions seem interlinked as the Act provides that where amnesty 
is not granted, the process for filing a criminal case should be pursued.
56
 It is possible 
that the Commission will use the powers designated under s.40 to frame rules to 
develop a series of procedural safeguards for potential applicants. However, as it 
stands, the Act falls below the standards to which commissions are internationally 
expected to operate in accordance with.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
                                                        
54
 S. 26(3) and (4). 
55
 S. 26(5). 
56
 S. 26(9). 
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Thus, the truth commission accountability programmes established to date entail 
varying levels of protection for those who participate in them, from the robust 
safeguarding of individual rights within the South African model to the seeming 
absence of protection within the Nepalese Act. The potential use of self-incriminating 
testimony is of particular concern due to the far-reaching consequences its use in 
subsequent legal proceedings might pose.  
 
 
3. Accountability initiatives and the privilege against self-incrimination 
 
3.1. The privilege against self-incrimination 
 
It might be assumed that the use in subsequent legal proceedings of self-incriminating 
information disclosed during transitional accountability initiatives would violate the 
privilege against self-incrimination and therefore the right to a fair trial. There is a 
wealth of legal provisions on the privilege against self-incrimination in criminal 
proceedings. It is well established in international law as a fundamental facet of the 
right to a fair trial and enshrined in numerous international statutes and conventions,
57
 
                                                        
57
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 
Art. 14(3)(g); American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123, 
Art. 8(2)(7). Neither the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights nor the European Convention 
on Human Rights explicitly mention the right against self-incrimination. In the ECHR context, it has 
been recognized in the jurisprudence on Art. 6. See, John Murray v. UK, Decision of 8 February 1996, 
[1996-I] ECHR 49 and Saunders v. UK, Decision of 17 December 1996, [1996] ECHR 65, at para. 68.  
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as well as in many national legal systems.
58
 It is protected within the Statutes for the 
ad hoc tribunals,
59
 in those of some of the hybrid courts
60
 and at the investigation and 
trial stages within the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
61
   
 
Scholarship evinces some consensus that the privilege serves to ensure that a suspect 
cannot be required to provide authorities with information that might be used against 
him in a criminal trial.
62
 It ‘presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to 
prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through 
methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused’. 63 
Internationally, there is agreement that the privilege offers protection at two crucial 
stages; endowing a defendant with a right not to give evidence at trial and a suspect 
with a right to silence in pre-trial criminal investigations.
64
  
                                                        
58
 M.C. Bassiouni, “Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International 
Procedural Protections in National Constitutions”, (1992-3) 3 Duke Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 235, 265, n.138.  
59
Art. 21(4)(g) ICTY St; Art. 20(4)(g) ICTR St. 
60
 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, appended to the Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, Art. 17(4)(g); Law on 
the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 35(g). 
61
 Arts. 55(1)(a) and 67(1)(g). 
62
 M. Redmayne, ‘Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination’, (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 209. See also P. McInerney, ‘The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination from Early 
Origins to Judges’ Rules: Challenging the “Orthodox View”’, [2014] International Journal of Evidence 
and Proof 101. 
63
 Saunders, supra note 57, para. 68. See also Redmayne, ibid, at 225. 
64
 McInerney, supra note 62.  
 17 
 
Although there appears to be increasing global acceptance of, and respect for such 
rights, there is no uniform international practice in relation to them.
65
 Different 
jurisdictions recognise variations of the privilege at different junctures of the criminal 
process
66
 and interpret its requirements differently.
67
 Even within international human 
rights instruments there is no consensus on the stage at which the privilege is 
engaged. Some instruments refer to post-charge protection,
68
 while others simply 
consider the privilege applicable when a criminal ‘accusation’ is made. 69  This 
confusion is argued to flow from the lack of an underpinning rationale justifying the 
privilege,
70
 with it having been rationalised on autonomy,
71
 choice
72
 and privacy 
grounds,
73
 among others.  
 
                                                        
65
 C. Bradley (ed.), Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, (1999). 
66
 Ibid.  
67
 See M. Berger, ‘Compelled Self-Reporting and the Principle Against Compelled Self-Incrimination: 
Some Comparative Perspectives’, 2006 European Human Rights Law Review 25.  
68
 ICCPR, Art. 14(3)(g). See also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(c).  
69
 ACHR, Art. 8(2)(7). 
70
 D. Dolinko, ‘Is there a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?’, (1986) 33 UCLA 
Law Review 1063; R. Allen, ‘Theorizing About Self-Incrimination’, (2008) 30 Cardozo Law Review 
751. 
71
 Redmayne, supra note 62, at 218-25.   
72
 B. M. Dann, ‘The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical 
Evidence from a Suspect’, (1970) 43 Southern California Law Review 597; W. J. Stuntz, ‘Self-
Incrimination and Excuse’, (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 1227.  
73
 A. E. Taslitz, ‘Confessing in the Human Voice: A Defense of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination’, (2008) 7 Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal 121.   
 18 
The lack of clarity on the nature and scope of the privilege makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether it protects individuals within accountability schemes. The following 
sections draw on national and regional jurisprudence in an effort to develop a broad 
understanding of whether the privilege is engaged in relation to those offering 
testimony as part of national accountability initiatives and, if so, the nature of the 
protection it might offer.  
 
 
3.2. Applicability of the Privilege 
 
It is first necessary to assess the applicability of the privilege in proceedings that are 
not strictly part of, but may have links to, the formal criminal process. International 
and regional attention, at the UN Human Rights Committee,
74
 Inter-American Court
75
 
and African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights,
76
 has primarily focused on 
whether the use of physical force and verbal abuse to obtain confessions amount to a 
violation. The situation at issue here is more akin to some of those that have been 
                                                        
74
 Human Rights Committee, ICCPR A/52/40 vol. I (1997), paras. 241-2, 357; ICCPR A/56/40 vol. I 
(2001) 59, 70; ICCPR A/59/40 vol. I (2003) 15; ICCPR A/60/40 vol I. (2004), 25; ICCPR A/60/40 vol. 
I (2005), 70.  
75
 Cabrera Garcia and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 26 November 2010; Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 27 November 2003. 
76
 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Arab Republic of Egypt, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 368/09 (2014); Malawi African Association 
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considered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), making its 
jurisprudence most pertinent to this evaluation.  
 
Although the privilege is not expressly included within the ECHR, the Court has 
inferred it from human rights instruments and the guarantee of a fair trial in Art 
6(1).
77
  The ECtHR’s judgments reveal a distinction between the right to silence, 
when an accused fails to answer questions or to testify, and the privilege against self-
incrimination, which involves the threat of coercion to obtain information from an 
accused.
78
 For the ECtHR, the privilege lies at the heart of a fair procedure by 
supporting the presumption of innocence and contributing to the avoidance of 
miscarriages of justice.
79
 The cases considered primarily fall into two camps: those 
relating to the use of compulsion for the purpose of obtaining information which 
might incriminate the person concerned in pending criminal proceedings against 
them
80
 and those which relate to the use of incriminating information compulsorily 
obtained outside the context of criminal proceedings in a subsequent prosecution.
81
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Beyond this categorization, the Court has deemed the privilege to apply across a 
range of subtler scenarios. Case law shows that the privilege is engaged not only (1) 
at trial
82
 and (2) during the pre-trial phase.
83
 It also applies (3) in procedures deemed 
to fall within the autonomous meaning of a criminal charge, including administrative 
investigations or disciplinary procedures,
84
 (4) where evidence is obtained under 
compulsion in non-punitive procedures but is later used in criminal proceedings 
against the person concerned;
85
 and (5) where a person is penalized for failure to 
comply with a duty to provide information.
86
 The Court has therefore taken an 
expansive and protective approach in relation to the privilege.  
 
However, the convolution of the case law presents challenges in ascertaining its 
applicability to accountability schemes. Accountability schemes are not analogous to 
trial or pre-trial proceedings as they do not form part of the formal criminal process. 
Neither is it clear that the case law on procedures that fall within the autonomous 
meaning of a criminal charge would encompass accountability schemes, although it 
has been held that a variety of proceedings including taxation,
87
 prison discipline
88
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and minor traffic offences
89
 can fall within this category. In determining whether 
situations fall within the autonomous meaning of a criminal charge, the Court 
examines, alternatively and not cumulatively,
90
 the classification of the offence under 
domestic law, the nature of the offence and the severity of the penalty.
91
 
Accountability schemes are concerned with actions that fall within the confines of the 
criminal law. However, no offence will actually have been charged or penalty 
imposed when an individual decides to participate and, although not required in the 
Court’s jurisprudence,92 the domestic law creating the scheme will not belong under 
the criminal branch, even if it is linked indirectly to it. At the same time, the Court has 
dismissed the suggestion that the privilege is not at issue simply because there are no 
substantive proceedings underway in which information could be used.
93
  It has 
stressed that it is not uncommon for procedures to combine varying elements and that 
it may not be possible to separate those parts of the proceedings which determine a 
‘criminal charge’ from those parts that do not.94 
 
It is similarly unclear whether the second criteria that ‘the offence in question is by its 
nature to be regarded as criminal’95 would be met.  Although accountability schemes 
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are concerned with criminal conduct, their purpose may be considered non-punitive in 
that they are tasked with granting amnesties or facilitating reintegration agreements. 
On the other hand, if deemed ineligible for the scheme, criminal proceedings and 
punitive sanctions may follow. The final criteria that the ‘offence renders the person 
liable to a penalty which by its nature and degree of severity belongs in the general 
criminal sphere’ does seem to be met as in the event that individuals are deemed 
ineligible for participation in accountability schemes they become liable to 
prosecution and, if convicted, attendant penalties.
96
 The Court has also made clear 
that where it is difficult to reach a clear conclusion based on the separate analysis of 
each criterion, a cumulative approach may be necessary.
97
 Such an approach, coupled 
with the Court’s determination to provide real, rather than illusory protection,98 may 
support the contention that accountability schemes can be encompassed within 
procedures falling within the autonomous meaning of a criminal charge. Yet, it 
remains difficult to state definitively that accountability schemes fall under this 
category. 
 
It might be considered that accountability schemes are more likely to come within the 
fourth scenario. This is illustrated in Saunders, where the applicant complied with a 
directive that he answer potentially self-incriminating questions under the threat of 
contempt during an administrative procedure, and his responses were subsequently 
used in his distinct but related criminal prosecution for breach of the Companies Act 
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1985. The Court found a violation of his right to a fair trial on the basis of the use of 
the compelled statements at trial; the issue on which the alleged violation was based.  
 
The Court did not consider whether the privilege was applicable in the administrative 
proceedings, but noted that the function of these were investigative and non-
adjudicative, with a purpose of recording facts which might subsequently be used as 
the basis for action by other competent authorities. The Court noted that a 
requirement that preparatory investigations should be subject to the guarantees set 
forth in Article 6(1) would unduly hamper the effective regulation in the public 
interest of complex financial and commercial activities.
99
 In relation to accountability 
schemes, this may suggest that the privilege is not applicable during accountability 
proceedings themselves as these may be considered investigative and non-
adjudicative. Information is sought not for the purpose of prosecution, but to 
contribute to national truth seeking and to determine eligibility for an accountability 
scheme. Nonetheless, the Saunders decision appears to suggest that as long as 
compulsion can be demonstrated,
100
 the privilege might prevent the use of 
incriminating statements obtained in accountability schemes in any subsequent trial 
for the same conduct.  
 
Finally, the ECtHR has examined cases where a person is penalized for failure to 
comply with a duty to provide information.
101
 An issue of preliminary importance in 
these cases in that there must be a sufficiently proximate link between the obligation 
                                                        
99
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to disclose information and the possibility of criminal proceedings; the possibility 
must be more than remote and hypothetical.
102
 The Court has distinguished situations 
where criminal proceedings were pending or anticipated
103
 from those where they 
were not. In the latter situation it has frequently been found that the privilege is not 
engaged.
104
 Yet such decisions are not always unanimously reached and judicial 
division has emerged on the point at which criminal proceedings are envisaged.
105
 
Accountability schemes cannot easily be considered equivalent to such a scenario as 
there is no duty, perhaps other than a moral one, to participate and disclose 
information. The Court’s reasoning in such cases is nevertheless interesting as it again 
demonstrates a desire to provide protection where domestic disclosure laws 
extinguish “the very essence of the …rights to silence and against self-
incrimination’.106  
 
This contextual approach to decision making on applicability, coupled with the 
inherent judicial division,
107
 is not unique to the ECtHR. Canadian courts have also 
stressed the importance of context in cases concerning the privilege, adopting a case-
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by-case analysis of the specific circumstances.
108
 In US jurisprudence, it has been 
held that Fifth Amendment protections apply only where the individual is asked to 
give testimony that may expose him to criminal charge.
109
 ‘The central standard for 
the privilege's application is whether the [person concerned] is confronted by 
substantial and “real,” and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of 
incrimination’.110 Again, this has resulted in a line of jurisprudence in which various 
cases have fallen on different sides of the threshold. 
111
  
 
While case-by-case analysis seems logical, it creates difficulty in ascertaining whether 
the privilege protects disclosures made within accountability schemes. None of the 
scenarios considered before national or regional courts replicate exactly the scenario 
present in accountability schemes. Yet, a general theme across relevant jurisprudence 
seems to be the need for some form of connection between disclosures and criminal 
proceedings, whether that is explicit as in trial and pre-trial proceedings or implicit 
where, for example, on consideration of the facts, Article 6 under its criminal head is 
deemed to apply to administrative proceedings. Simply because criminal proceedings 
are unlikely to be pending or directly anticipated at the time of disclosure does not 
rule out the applicability of the privilege in relation to accountability schemes. The 
                                                        
108
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ECtHR has dismissed such arguments across the categories of cases considered, 
preferring instead to afford protection where, on a contextual consideration of all the 
facts, it considers it necessary.  
 
In accountability schemes, the system requiring disclosure may only be potentially 
and indirectly linked to criminal proceedings, yet the threat of prosecution remains 
present if disclosure is not forthcoming and that threat provides the impetus for 
disclosure. The dangers of assuming a clear distinction between criminal and non-
criminal inquiries have been warned against.
112
 Choo notes that it may ‘too readily be 
overlooked that, despite appearances, an individual subject to a regulatory procedure 
may actually be “in peril” of a criminal prosecution in respect of an offence to which 
the information required may be relevant’.113 Thus an argument can be made that the 
integral place of prosecution within accountability schemes means that those who 
participate within them are in fact ‘in peril’ of prosecution and that the privilege 
should therefore be considered applicable. 
 
 
 
3.3. Compulsion 
 
Even if it is accepted that the privilege is applicable in the context of accountability 
schemes, in order for the privilege to provide protection, it must also be established 
                                                        
112
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that the testimony is ‘compelled’. The UN Human Rights Committee has considered 
that direct or indirect physical or psychological pressure comes within the scope of 
the privilege.
114
 On the other hand, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
held that being urged to tell the truth does not amount to compulsion.
115
   
 
For the ECtHR, what is of interest is ‘improper compulsion’ and whether the degree 
of compulsion imposed on the accused destroyed the very essence of the privilege and 
the right to remain silent.
116
 Thus, not every measure employed to encourage 
individuals to offer information that might be used in criminal proceedings, will be 
considered to amount to improper compulsion.
117
 Context is important, with 
decisions, again, reached on a case-by-case basis. Compulsion has been held to be 
improper where the state has used the threat of criminal punishment to compel the 
provision of potentially self-incriminating evidence in criminal cases.
118
 It is similarly 
improper for the state to resort to subterfuge in order to obtain self-incriminating 
information that an individual refused to give at interview and to use that information 
at trial.
119
 The use in criminal proceedings of statements made under the threat of 
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imprisonment in a compelled reporting system amounts to a violation,
120
 but the use 
of compulsory powers to require individuals to provide information relating to 
financial or company affairs does not.
121
 Neither do identity disclosure requirements 
under domestic traffic laws violate the privilege.
122
 Similarly, as long as procedural 
self-incrimination protections are in place, it is permissible for adverse inferences to 
be drawn from silence.
123
 Yet while it is clear that for the Court the privilege is only 
engaged where the compulsion is deemed improper, it is not altogether clear where 
the line between proper and improper is drawn. 
 
US courts apply an objective test for compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, which 
asks whether ‘considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the 
witness was overborne’.124 This too has given rise to case-by-case contextual analysis 
of whether governmental action has exceeded the threshold for the compulsion 
necessary for a Fifth Amendment violation.
125
 The US courts have produced a list of 
acceptable and unacceptable actions, locating types of pressure along their perception 
of the proper continuum.
126
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Canadian jurisprudence on compulsion has been described as “haphazard”.127 The 
Supreme Court has stated that, ‘any state action that coerces an individual to furnish 
evidence against him- or herself in a proceeding in which the individual and the state 
are adversaries violates the principle against self-incrimination. Coercion…means the 
denial of free and informed consent’.128  This has been consistently interpreted as 
meaning that all statements made where an individual is obliged by law to give 
information are, per se, compelled. However, the case law is less consistent in cases 
where the voluntariness of disclosure has been in question, with contextual analysis of 
whether the individual’s will was, in all the circumstances, overborne again resulting 
in cases falling either side of the acceptable/unacceptable threshold.
129
    
 
If the privilege is to provide protection for those participating within accountability 
schemes, it must be established that disclosures are ‘compelled’. From one 
perspective, self-incriminating testimony given in an accountability programme may 
not be considered to amount to compulsion.  Participation is, in theory, voluntary and 
many decide not to apply.
130
 The disclosure element of accountability schemes might 
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be argued to be equivalent to being urged to tell the truth, which for the Inter-
American Court cannot amount to compulsion unless accompanied by threat of 
punishment for non-disclosure or by a requirement to testify under oath.
131
  
 
For the ECtHR, decisions to participate in alternatives to criminal proceedings cannot 
be considered voluntary where those decisions are ‘tainted by constraint’.132 Unless 
decisions are conscious, voluntary and free from duress or false promises
133
 fair trial 
protections continue to apply and cannot be considered waived. In the context of 
accountability schemes, it might be argued that the ‘decision’ to participate is not 
voluntary but ‘tainted by constraint’ due to the consequences that can, indeed should, 
flow from non-participation. For example, in South Africa, those who did not apply 
for amnesty and disclose involvement in past violations remained liable to civil suit 
and criminal prosecution. That will also be the case under the Nepali scheme. In 
Timor Leste, those who did not apply for CRP and disclose past wrongdoing risked 
prosecution as well as ostracization in a society in which community is central.  
 
Potential participants are faced with a difficult, perhaps ‘constrained’, choice. 134 
Individuals must decide whether to participate, disclose and risk being denied 
amnesty and subsequently prosecuted or decide not to participate and risk prosecution 
if involvement in past crimes subsequently comes to light. There may not be a legal 
obligation to participate in the first instance and no direct legal penalties for failure to 
                                                        
131
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offer incriminating information, but the potential risks of not participating and 
testifying seem too great to ignore. Thus, the threat of the consequences that may flow 
from non-participation ‘compel’ individuals to participate in accountability schemes. 
It is not compulsion in the traditional sense of being physically forced or legally 
obliged to offer information. However, the pressure exerted by the state upon 
individual decision-making through the legislative model of truth for amnesty versus 
potential prosecution arguably injects an element of compulsion into accountability 
programmes. It can be argued that compulsion should be understood broadly in this 
context in order to encompass the disclosures made by those who participate in 
accountability schemes. Moreover, without affording such protection the aims of 
accountability schemes may be thwarted as those upon whose participation they 
depend may be inhibited from offering testimony where they fear that their 
disclosures may subsequently be used against them.  
 
 
3.4. The scope of the privilege 
 
Even if it can be argued that the privilege is engaged and that compulsion can be 
understood broadly to encompass the situation here, it remains uncertain whether the 
privilege protects individuals from the use against them of self-incriminating 
disclosures made within accountability schemes in subsequent criminal proceedings. 
The scope of the privilege is contested. International law, generally, takes a generous 
approach. The ICTY has been described as ‘over-protective’ 135  in its approach, 
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interpreting the privilege broadly
136
 and excluding evidence where it considers that 
the right has not been adequately protected.
137
 The ICC Statute takes an expansive 
approach, not only protecting the accused against self-incrimination, but enabling the 
Court to provide assurances to witnesses who might provide incriminating 
evidence.
138
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone also emphasized the importance of 
the privilege in its jurisprudence.
139
 
 
At the same time, it is clear that the privilege is not absolute and may be subject to 
limitations. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on limitations and exceptions to the privilege 
is not consistent and a range of factors, including public interest, have been examined 
in making determinations. In early case law, the Court rejected arguments that 
limitation was justified in the public interest,
140
 stating that both the fairness 
requirements of Article 6 generally and the privilege itself should ‘apply to all 
criminal proceedings in respect of all types of criminal offences without distinction 
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from the most simple to the most complex’.141 However, the Court has subsequently 
departed from this stance. In Jalloh,
142
 in which the applicant, following arrest, was 
forced to regurgitate a bag of cocaine that was used as evidence against him at trial, 
the Court applied a four-factor test to determine whether the privilege had been 
violated, considering in turn the nature and degree of compulsion, the public interest 
in securing conviction, the existence of legal safeguards and the use to which the 
information was put. It thereby introduced a case-by-case approach to determining 
whether the privilege has been violated.  
 
Versions of the Jalloh test have been applied in other cases, despite the very different 
scenarios involved. In the conjoined case of O’Halloran and Francis the Court noted 
that O’Halloran’s situation was similar to that of Saunders, whereas Francis was 
considered closer to Funke and Heaney and McGuinness in each of which the 
applicant was fined for not providing information.
143
 Nevertheless, the Court 
considered the cases together and applied a three-stage version of the Jalloh test, 
excluding the public interest, and permitted limitation of the privilege in a case 
involving the statutory obligation on vehicle owners under UK law to provide details 
of the driver in certain circumstances. The limitation was considered justified due to 
the direct nature of the compulsion used to obtain information from O’Halloran and to 
attempt to obtain information from Francis: both had been informed in the Notice of 
Prosecution that they were required to provide the information sought and that failure 
to do so was a criminal offence punishable by a fine and driving penalties.
144
 The fact 
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that the compulsion formed part of a regulatory scheme that fairly imposes 
obligations on drivers in order to impose road safety was significant. The Court also 
noted that the information required under the scheme was simple, specific and 
restricted and there was a legal safeguard in the form of a defence of due diligence.
145
 
The nature and degree of the compulsion, the existence of legal safeguards and the 
use to which the information was put
146
 justified departure from the privilege.
147
  
 
National courts have also grappled with limitations, particularly in cases where a 
person is penalized for failure to comply with a duty to provide information. In Brown 
v. Stott,
148
 which concerned a traffic statutory self-reporting regime, the reporting 
requirement was upheld by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Lord 
Bingham balanced the public interest in dealing with the misuse of vehicles on the 
roads against the intrusion on the suspect's interests. He considered that the single 
question asked and the moderate, non-custodial penalty provided by the statute for 
refusing to respond did not overall impinge upon the fairness of the proceedings.
149
 
The U.S. Supreme Court made similar findings in California v. Byers, adopting a 
balancing approach to resolve the tension between the state and individual interests. It 
held that compliance with a regulatory, non-criminal statute in which self-reporting is 
indispensable to its fulfillment, where the burden is on the public at large and where 
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the possibility of incrimination is not substantial, does not infringe the privilege.
150
 
Yet, in the Canadian case of R. v. White,
151
 where the prosecution sought to admit as 
evidence the compelled statements of the defendant obtained through statutory self-
reporting laws, the opposite conclusion was reached. Although the Supreme Court 
also sought to balance the privilege against individual and societal interests, it held 
that use of the compelled self-identification report would be a violation of the 
privilege and therefore the Charter.
 152
  
 
Although these cases give rise to different outcomes, together they suggest that a 
range of factors is relevant in determining whether a particular instance of self-
incrimination amounts to a violation. As with other aspects of the privilege, the 
balancing
153
 of various factors in reaching decisions makes it difficult to assess 
whether disclosures made in accountability schemes will be protected. On the one 
hand, the case law suggests that limitation may not be permitted in relation to 
transitional accountability schemes. Limitations appear typically to have been 
permitted where the consequences of self-incrimination are insubstantial, such as 
fines and non-custodial penalties, the information required is narrow and specific and 
is to be used for a pre-determined and restricted purpose, such as under motoring 
statutory self-reporting regimes. In transitional accountability schemes, the 
                                                        
150
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consequences of self-incrimination may be substantial as disclosure of involvement in 
past violations is a requirement of participation. The information required is broad 
and detailed as ‘full disclosure’ is very often a determinative criterion of eligibility for 
amnesty. In addition, the use(s) to which disclosures might be put is undetermined. In 
South Africa, the TRC Act prevented the use of disclosures in proceedings other than 
those of the truth commission itself. However, in Timor Leste, disclosures were used 
not only as the basis for CRP but were also shared with prosecuting bodies. The 
legislation in Kenya and Nepal permits the sharing of incriminating statements 
between truth seeking and prosecutorial institutions, with no apparent bars on the use 
of statements to further criminal cases. Thus, the use of disclosures may be wide and 
varied. In light of these considerations, limitation of the privilege through the use of 
incriminating disclosures in subsequent proceedings may well be deemed illegitimate.  
 
Consideration of the public interest raises different, and more difficult, issues. The 
wrongdoing disclosed in the course of accountability schemes is wide-ranging, 
involving human rights violations related to physical integrity and property 
destruction. There may be an argument that where amnesty for such crimes is not 
granted due to the lack of a political objective, it is in the public interest for those 
responsible to be prosecuted and, if found guilty, punished and that such an interest 
justifies some restriction of the privilege through the use of self-incriminating 
statements. At the same time, it is also in the public interest for former perpetrators to 
participate within accountability schemes in order for transitional objectives around 
accountability to be achieved and to lay the foundations for a peaceful and reconciled 
future. If perpetrators suspect that there is a possibility that amnesty will be refused 
and that their disclosures might then be used to further investigations or employed 
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against them in subsequent trials they will be less likely to participate, thereby 
limiting the prospects for reconciliation.
154
 Again, therefore, in the interests of 
ensuring the efficacy of truth seeking procedures and maximizing the possibilities for 
reconciliation through accountability schemes the privilege should be protected 
without limitation.  
 
 
4. Use-immunity as a solution 
 
One potential solution to the problem of how to maximize truth seeking and 
reconciliation goals through participation within accountability schemes, which are by 
their nature dependent on the disclosure of self-incriminating statements, might be to 
afford use-immunity to those disclosures. Granting use-immunity to compelled 
disclosures in subsequent criminal prosecutions is a compromise in many legal 
systems.
155
 It has also been suggested as a solution to the use by prosecutorial bodies 
of statements obtained by truth commissions under powers of compulsion. It has been 
argued that investigative authorities should be able to use compelled statements to 
further investigations, provided that they can ultimately prove that the evidence 
offered at a future trial could reasonably have been discovered in the absence of the 
compelled testimony.
156
 Yet, as Berger notes, use-immunity might prevent 
evidentiary use of compelled statements in the suspect's prosecution, but it leaves the 
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authorities aware of the illegal activities learned through disclosure. Unless the 
immunity extends to both evidentiary and non-evidentiary uses of the information 
compelled from the suspect, it cannot provide adequate protection.
157
  
 
Derivative use-immunity, which pertains to both evidentiary and non-evidentiary uses 
of compelled information, is not routinely available within many domestic systems. 
The admissibility of statements is typically considered on a case-by-case basis and 
excluded where deemed to impinge upon the overall fairness of proceedings.
158
 In the 
context of transitional accountability schemes, derivative use immunity can be an 
essential element of safeguarding both individual rights and the efficacy of the 
initiative itself. It can bolster individual rights by preventing the use of incriminating 
statements in any subsequent criminal investigations or proceedings. This is turn can 
facilitate participation within accountability initiatives by dispelling concern among 
potential participants that their statements might later be used against them, thereby 
maximizing the potential of such schemes to make a meaningful contribution to 
accountability and longer term stability and reconciliation. For this to operate 
effectively, derivative use immunity must be guaranteed within the domestic 
legislation that creates the accountability scheme. To leave this to prosecuting bodies 
may perpetuate uncertainty among potential participants, risking their involvement 
within the scheme altogether.  
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Some may contend that in the interests of delivering criminal justice for past crimes, 
self-incriminating statements should be available for use in the furtherance of criminal 
cases, both in relation to investigations and in use as evidence, where amnesty has 
been denied. When this issue was considered in relation to self-incriminating 
testimony obtained in traditional truth seeking procedures, there seemed to be some 
agreement that it should be inadmissible in subsequent proceedings against the person 
concerned.
159
 However, there was also a body of support for denying use-immunity to 
compelled disclosures, suggesting that the use of information in this way is not 
believed to fall foul of fair trial standards.
160
 Nevertheless, and legal technicalities 
aside, a sense of injustice arises where individuals are required to confess their 
involvement in past crimes, often without a right to legal advice, in order to 
participate in one process only to be found ineligible for inclusion in that process and 
prosecuted in relation to the crimes they have disclosed. Such a situation cannot easily 
be reconciled with notions of leaving behind past injustice and the promotion of a 
human rights culture that accountability scheme establishment is intended to 
represent. Again, this supports the contention that, in the interests of the efficacy and 
integrity of the accountability scheme itself, the sharing with prosecutorial bodies of 
self-incriminating disclosures ought to be prohibited. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Accountability schemes aimed at the reintegration of low-level perpetrators are an 
important element of transitional justice programmes and are believed to make a 
significant contribution to the long-term stability and reconciliation of transitional 
states. To deny those upon whose participation they depend procedural rights, is to 
risk the very efficacy of the schemes themselves. The possibility of self-incriminating 
statements being passed to prosecutorial bodies either to further criminal 
investigations or for use in later trials may well inhibit participation within these 
schemes, limiting the possibilities for holding lower level perpetrators to account. It 
will also likely raise questions about the integrity of the accountability scheme as 
there is something unsettling about purporting to require disclosure for one purpose 
only to use it for another.  
 
It remains difficult to determine categorically whether the privilege offers protection 
to those who make self-incriminating disclosures in the course of participation within 
transitional accountability schemes. This article suggested that through a 
reconceptualization and broadening of the concept of compulsion, the privilege can 
include the situation under consideration here. Admittedly, however, providing 
protection on the basis of the privilege to those who make self-incriminating 
disclosures in accountability schemes is currently problematic due to judicial 
understandings of compulsion, which do not easily encompass this scenario. While 
the privilege might ultimately prevent the use of disclosures against relevant 
individuals within subsequent trials, such an eventuality is in itself undesirable. 
Challenges by the defence to the use of self-incriminating disclosures on fair trial 
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grounds will likely cause delay or perhaps even derail cases altogether.  Failed 
prosecutions of serious human rights violations are not in the interests of transitional 
states or those of victims.  
 
The solution appears to lie in granting use-immunity to self-incriminating disclosures, 
preventing their use in evidentiary and non-evidentiary proceedings. Future 
accountability schemes should therefore be designed with an inbuilt system of 
safeguards that provide use-immunity to self-incriminating disclosures. Such 
safeguards ought to be laid down in the legislation that creates and regulates the 
accountability scheme, which will often also be the truth commission enacting 
legislation. While conclusions on immunity typically lie in the realm of prosecuting 
bodies, this is not a solution to the current issue. The uncertainty generated by such an 
arrangement may impede the efficacy of the accountability scheme by inhibiting 
participation among those who fear the possibility of prosecution and the pending 
nature of the decision on immunity. Providing for use-immunity from the outset 
within enacting legislation will not only ensure the upholding of individual rights, but 
maintain the integrity of accountability schemes themselves, while maximizing the 
potential for participation in and long term impact from them. 
